Election sidelight
2 months ago
Analysis of Geopolitics, Human Rights, Globalization and the Politics of International Development
Dozens of civilians were killed over the weekend in Afghanistan, the latest in the trend of spiralling violence that has engulfed the embattled nation. The civilian casualties, Taliban attacks and troop casualty numbers are putting increasing strain on the Western-led coalition, leading some to speculate that the war is unwinnable.
On Sunday, international forces killed four Afghan police officers and five civilians during a fire-fight in the western province of Farah. In a separate incident that same night, coalition-fired mortar rounds killed at least four civilians in the eastern Paktika province. On Monday, in Laghman province, also in the east, Taliban fighters fired a missile into a fuel truck, killing six civilians.
The incidents come as the U.S. is fending off criticism from the Afghan government that coalition forces use excessive and inappropriate force. Last week, a group of Afghan parliamentarians revealed that a U.S. air-strike hit a wedding party in the Nangarhar province, killing 47 civilians. Two days earlier, local officials allege, another U.S. air-strike killed 15 civilians in the Nuristan province.
Refugees International has released a new report titled U.S. Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement: Lessons from the Operational Level in Africa. According to RI, it describes how what it terms “the increased militarization of U.S. foreign aid” is complicating the achievement of American foreign policy goals in Africa.
The report recommends that the US Africa Command, or AFRICOM, remain focused on security sector and peacekeeping capacity building, rather than hunting terror suspects under what it calls “a thin mantle of humanitarianism” when it becomes fully operational in October 2008.
[E]ven AFRICOM's (the US's) Africa Military Command) good intentions cannot disguise the geopolitical realities that compelled its creation. It's not about doing good works in impoverished countries for their own sake; It's about national interest. Countering China's growing military and economic influence in Africa and assuring access to some of the world's last remaining oil reserves top the list. (The United States now imports just as much oil from Africa as it does from the Middle East.) Terrorism also figures into the equation—primarily the elimination of ungoverned spaces terrorists might call home.
Not that these are unreasonable goals. On one level, the U.S. military's ability to adapt is impressive. But problems could arise if AFRICOM begins to lead policy rather than follow it. A report released yesterday by Refugees International shows that, in the years since 9/11, the Pentagon's slice of the nation's foreign aid budget has ballooned at the expense of more traditional providers, like USAID.
Some people believe Barack Obama, despite his professed Christianity, is secretly a Muslim. Others say that is just a rumor and Obama really is a Christian as he says, and point out he's attended a Christian church for years. What do you believe -- is Obama a Muslim or a Christian?
[T]he economy would have benefited enormously if large numbers of traders had shorted Fannie and Freddie 4 years ago when they were buying up hundreds of billions of mortgages issued to buyers who bought homes at bubble-inflated prices. This would have stopped the bubble years ago. Similarly, we could have prevented the financial chaos at Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Bear Stearns and the rest, if traders had recognized their financial shenanigans and aggressively shorted their stock. In the same vein, heavy shorting by informed investors could have prevented the boom and bust of the tech bubble.
The decision to intervene against short-selling is completely inconsistent with the belief in the wisdom of the markets. Of course short-sellers can be wrong and depress stock prices more than is justified by fundamentals, but so what? The government doesn't intervene when it thinks investors have exaggerated the true value of a stock. The public has no more reason to fear under-valued stock prices than over-valued stock prices. This one-sided intervention by SEC is hard to justify on any grounds. Reporters should be asking about it.
Three questions have each launched a thousand papers. First, how large are the gaps in compensation caused by various types of labor market discrimination? Second, how large are the relative price differentials in global markets caused by international borders? Third, how can public policies raise the incomes of poor households?
We bring these literatures together with an estimation of the differences between the wages of workers in 42 low- and middle-income countries and the wages those same people would earn in the United States. This calculation at once documents an enormous form of wage discrimination, measures a massive cross-border price wedge, and suggests a policy that could dramatically raise the earnings of many low-income families.
The first section of the paper creates baseline estimates of wage gaps controlling for individual observable traits. It does so with a unique harmonized database on the purchasing power price-adjusted wages and other traits of over two million workers in 43 countries, including the United States. This allows us to predict wages of observably identical workers on either side of the US border for each of these countries. Crucially, the US data identify the individuals’ country of birth and, for the foreign-born, year of arrival in the US. This allows our definition of “observably identical” to go beyond standard covariates such as years of schooling, age, sex, and rural/urban residence. We can also compare workers of the same country of birth—implicitly controlling for culture, language, and social networks—and same country of schooling—which adjusts for the quality and relevance of schooling.
The wage gaps that emerge from these initial estimates are large. For instance, in our preferred econometric specification,1 a Bolivian-born, Bolivian-educated, 35 year-old urban male formal sector wage worker with 9-12 years of schooling earns an average of US$1,831 per month working in the United States but US$460 (at purchasing power parity) working in Bolivia. Hence the earnings ratio between these observably identical people is 3.98. We produce estimates of the wage ratios of observably identical workers for each of 42 countries—we call these ratios Ro, where the subscript signifies “observably identical”.2 Bolivia’s ratio Ro of 3.98 is near the median, while the lowest such ratios we observe are from the Dominican Republic, at 1.37–1.43 (depending on the regression functional form) and the highest are for Nigeria, at 11.3–13.6.
But wage gaps for observably equivalent workers do not necessarily reflect wage discrimination. The second part of the paper grapples with the fact that, no matter how many individual traits are controlled for, wage differentials for observably equivalent workers do not necessarily constitute evidence of wage differentials across workers of equal intrinsic productivity, as foreign-born workers in the US can obviously differ in unobservable ways from their observably identical counterparts back home. This issue is common to all attempts to measure discrimination. In other words, wage ratios for observably-equivalent workers—Ro—are not the same as wage ratios for workers of equal intrinsic productivity who would be willing to move from one country to another; we call this latter ratio Re.
One factor that leads to wage gaps between foreign-born workers in the US and observably identical workers abroad is selection on unobservable determinants of productivity—selection both by the migrants themselves and by migration policy. The effect of selection on the wage gaps we measure is complex and we explore it below with a new theoretical model. The true wage gain to a typical migrant depends on two separate but related aspects of selection: where migrants come from within the source-country distribution of unobservable productivity determinants (selection), and where they end up
within the destination-country distribution of unobservable productivity determinants (sorting). The higher is migrants’ typical position in the origin-country distribution of unobserved productivity determinants—all else equal—the lower is the wage gain. But the higher is migrants’ typical position in the destination-country distribution of unobserved productivity determinants—all else equal—the higher is the gain.
The model shows that positive selection on unobservable traits from the origin country is neither necessary nor sufficient for overestimation of the wage gain to migration. If migrants come from the upper part of the distribution of unobserved productivity determinants in the origin and were randomly sorted into the wage distribution in the destination country, then comparing “average” workers would indeed overstate the wage gain. But if selected migrants sort into the upper end of the distribution in the destination country, the comparison of wages for average workers with given observed traits can accurately reflect or even understate the gain. That is, if the people who are uncommonly intelligent, energetic or ambitious in the source country selectively migrate and are people who are uncommonly intelligent, energetic and ambitious in the destination country, their wage gain could be the same as—or even larger than—the wage gain to less intelligent and energetic people.
Furthermore, among those positively selected on unobservables from the origin, those bound for upper end of the distribution in the destination are more likely to be seen in the data than those bound for the middle or the bottom—the former have more to gain from migration than the latter and are thus more likely to move. We match a theory of selection (from the source country) and sorting (in the destination country) with data to estimate the bias attributable to selection on
unobservables.
Another, separate factor that can cause the wages of observably identical workers to differ across countries in the absence of discrimination is what we call “natural” barriers. Workers might require a compensating differential to bear the costs—broadly
considered—of moving to a new land. These include the difficulty of learning a new language, being away from one’s family, and entering new social networks, as well as the direct cost of travel. Workers might also be credit-constrained and have difficulty financing the move.
Only a completely exogenous movement of workers across borders would allow estimation of wage gains without selection and without “natural” forces determining who is willing and able to move. We do not present (or desire!) such an experiment. Instead, we triangulate using five distinct methods to place estimated bounds on selection and natural barriers—drawing on theory and various empirical literatures. These independent calculations yield the remarkably consistent result that selection of migrants on unobservable wage determinants results in an observed US-to-foreign wage ratio for observably equivalent workers (Ro) of around 1.25 times the true ratio for equal-productivity workers on average across countries, and that the combined effect of selection and natural barriers produces observed ratios about 1.5 times the true ratio for equal-productivity workers willing and able to move (Re).
Even after this correction, wage gaps across borders remain extremely large. Given our median observed ratio Ro of about 3.9, the median ratio purged of selection on unobservable wage determinants and the effects of “natural” barriers—wage ratios of
equally productive workers willing to move (Re)—is roughly 2.6 (=3.9/1.5). Even this conservative estimate of Re is above 3 for many countries—including India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Ghana, Yemen, Egypt, Haiti, and Nigeria. In other words, a worker from one of these countries can expect at the margin his or her wages to triple or more, solely due to stepping across the US border.
This wage gap is a “marginal” effect in two distinct senses: It is the effect on the wage of the next person who would arrive after a small relaxation of the migration barrier—not the effect on the typical person in the sending country—and it is the marginal effect given a small change in current levels of migration—not the general equilibrium wage under fully open borders.
The final section relates our results to the three separate literatures on wage discrimination, border-induced price wedges, and the marginal impacts of antipoverty policies. Researchers measuring each of these would do well to pay much more attention
to restrictions on migration; the wage gaps we measure constitute one of the largest known forms of all three. Empirical estimates in these other literatures are comparable to ours because they, too, are measured at the margin.
Greater government intervention is needed to moderate the severe economic swings and inequalities that seem to be an unavoidable byproduct of globalization, according to a United Nations report released yesterday.
Pointing to food riots in dozens of poor countries whipsawed by soaring prices for wheat and other staples, and to the rising income inequality that has become a too-common feature of economies in the developed world, the report says that no one is immune from the sometimes cruel consequences of global economic forces. But governments should do more, both individually and collectively, to protect people from their harshest impacts, it says.
The U.N.'s 2008 World Economic and Social Survey calls for greater regulation of international capital flows, more generous foreign aid and perhaps the guarantee of a minimum income to the world's poorest residents. Domestically, countries should do more to cushion their citizens against economic changes that have left them less secure. In poor countries, the insecurity can take the form of hunger and food shortages; in developed nations it often means stagnating wages and growing income inequality.
"Markets cannot be left to their own devices in respect of delivering appropriate and desired levels of economic security," the report says.
Global competition, which erodes the security of businesses, unstable capital flows, which crimp investment and growth, and food shortages are sometimes viewed as beyond the ability of governments to control. But the report says that is the wrong response. What is needed, it says, is "more active policy responses to help communities better manage these new risks."
The U.N.'s assessment was echoed in a separate report published yesterday by the International Monetary Fund.
The IMF study warned that the recent sharp increases in food and fuel prices have had serious global impacts, and that import-dependent poor and middle-income countries were the most adversely affected. The report also said that food and fuel prices were likely to remain high and ease only gradually, raising inflation, and worsening poverty in these countries.
"Some countries are at a tipping point," IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn said at a news conference announcing the release of the study. "If food prices rise further and oil prices stay the same, some governments will no longer be able to feed their people and at the same time maintain stability in their economies."
A number of factors have contributed to the price spikes. In recent years, sustained global growth, especially in emerging and developing economies, has brought about greater demand for many commodities, including oil, metals and food. "At the same time, supply has been slow to respond to the demand impetus, notwithstanding rising prices," the IMF report said. "The food price surge is expected to take longer than usual to unwind."
"We expect continued upward pressure from demand," said Thomas Helbling, an IMF adviser. "We see no reason to not see these trends continue."
The IMF called for a multilateral approach to address the situation, involving broad cooperation among the countries affected, donors and international organizations.
C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, agreed with recommendations for a more activist role by governments in easing the pain caused by globalization. He said more attention should be paid to regulating capital flows and bolstering international aid. Domestically, he said, the focus should be on helping individuals hurt by the process.
While global trade has been a plus to the U.S. economy, Bergsten said, "the dislocating effects on American workers, impact on job insecurity, wage stagnation, worsening income distribution, require a substantial showing up of domestic safety net programs."
Without attention to that, support for globalization, which tends to grow shaky as economies cool, would be further undermined. "Where the country as a whole benefits substantially from globalization, there are certainly individuals who are losers from the process and then they therefore oppose it," he added.
The U.N. report calls for a range of interventions to provide support, including greater public investment in agriculture for poor countries and "a better balance of economic and social policies." It also said that even during economic booms governments should remain mindful of the downturns that can strike quickly, and set aside money to deal with them.
• Exempting civilian contractors from prosecution under Iraqi laws; it assures their immunity elsewhere as well; current federal law "only subjects contractors working in support of the Defense Department to prosecution in American courts for felonies in Iraq;" civilian security forces (like Blackwater Worldwide), the State Department, CIA and others will be in a "no-law" status, subject only to the will of the president; civilians may thus commit murders, rapes, robberies, other lawless acts and get away with them; "no (known) existing status of forces agreement....contains anything like this wide-ranging exemption;"
• Exempting military personnel as well who can be court-martialed but rarely are;
• Allowing the president to exceed his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief; he’s only in charge of the military, "not all Americans working overseas;"
• Even worse, most administration plans are secret and what’s learned comes out in leaks; more on that below; and
• Congress held hearings on January 23 and February 8 - "on the legitimate scope of the Iraqi agreement;" the administration refused to testify.
"[A]n agreement that defines the legal position of a ’visiting’ military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state." It delineates "the status of visiting military forces (and) may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its member to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements."
In his 2004 book, The Sorrows of Empire, Chalmers Johnson said this about SOFAs:
"America’s foreign military enclaves, though structurally, legally, and conceptually different from colonies, are themselves something like microcolonies in that they are completely beyond the jurisdiction of the occupied nation. The US virtually always negotiates a ’status of forces agreement’ (SOFA) with the ostensibly independent ’host’ nation" - a modern day version of 19th century China’s "extraterritoriality" granting foreigners charged with crimes the "right" to be tried by his (or her) own government under his (or her) own national law.
SOFA experts Rachel Cornwell and Andrew Wells added:
"Most SOFAs are written so that national courts cannot exercise legal jurisdiction over US military personnel who commit crimes against local people, except in special cases where US military authorities agree to transfer jurisdiction." As a result, when crimes occur, the military can simply whisk offenders out of the country before local authorities can react or at least before they’re arrested."
In the present atmosphere, once you say anything positive about protectionism, people dismiss you as a supporter of North Korea or Cuba.
The reality is that few countries practice pure free trade or pure protectionism. Most countries practice free trade in some areas and protectionism in others, with varying mixes across countries. This is basically because policy-makers instinctively understand that different sectors have different needs — sectors that are just emerging or in decline need more protection and subsidies in the same way that children and the elderly need more support than able-bodied adults do.
Chang shows how the entire debate over trade has divorced itself from history and economic reality. Phrases like “free trade,” in fact, are misnomers unto themselves, leading the world into a globalization debate whose basic premises are inaccurate.
But that’s not all that is inaccurate. Chang says that while the media and political elite lead us to believe industrialized countries achieved their wealth by eliminating tariffs, history suggests it’s exactly the opposite: The strategic use of tariffs is precisely what built the industrialized world into an economic powerhouse. Bad Samaritans shows that wealthy countries’ demands on poor countries to reduce tariffs is a way to keep the developing world in a subservient role — or a means to “kick away the ladder,” as he puts it.
Tax policies and employer-pay practices affect income distribution directly. But what governs these pay practices, and why have American voters and politicians chosen the tax policies they have? One answer lies in Americans’ unique attitudes toward inequality. Asked by the International Social Survey Programme whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that income differences in their home country are “too large,” 62 percent of Americans agreed; the median response for all 43 countries surveyed—some with a much lower degree of inequality—was 85 percent.
Americans and Europeans also tend to disagree about the causes of poverty. In a different survey—the World Values Survey, including 40 countries—American respondents were much more likely than European respondents (71 percent versus 40 percent) to agree with the statement that the poor could escape poverty if they worked hard enough. Conversely, 54 percent of European respondents, but only 30 percent of American respondents, agreed with the statement that luck determines income.
It makes intuitive sense that those who view poverty as a personal failing don’t feel compelled to redistribute money from the rich to the poor. Indeed, Ropes professor of political economy Alberto Alesina and Glimp professor of economics Edward L. Glaeser find a strong link between beliefs and tax policy: they find that a 10-percent increase in the share of the population that believes luck determines income is associated with a 3.5-percent increase in the share of GDP a given nation’s government spends on redistribution (see “Down and Out in Paris and Boston,” January-February 2005, page 14).
These attitudes, in turn, are rooted in US history, says Christopher Jencks, whose 1973 book Inequality examined social mobility in the United States. Jencks has been studying inequality and social class since the 1960s, and has written dozens of journal articles, essays, and book chapters, as well as four more books, on the subject. He looks back to the Constitution’s framers, who enshrined property rights as sacred and checked the government’s ability to control the national economy. “The founding fathers didn’t want the government to do that much,” he says.
The Constitution is structured in such a way that it is harder to change than the constitutions of Europe’s welfare states, where left-leaning groups have succeeded at writing in change. By and large, Alesina and Glaeser write, the U.S. Constitution “is still the same document approved by a minority of wealthy white men in 1776.” And the “vestiges of feudalism” in European society make leftist arguments appealing there, whereas American politicians’ rhetoric has emphasized individual agency since the time of George Washington (who wrote in 1783 that if citizens “should not be completely free and happy, the fault will be entirely their own”). The authors cite a 1980s history curriculum for public schools in California (“hardly the most right-wing of states,” they note) that instructed, “A course should assess the role of optimism and opportunity in a land of work: the belief that energy, initiative, and inventiveness will continue to provide a promising future.”
An alternative, and possibly complementary, explanation points to the United States’s particular place in geography and history. Jencks also finds this persuasive. “The highest levels of inequality are found in the New World and not the Old, for reasons we don’t understand,” he says. Societies with higher inequality also tend to have higher crime rates, although it’s not clear which way the causal arrow runs, or if it exists. “These are societies built on conquest, many of them on slavery,” Jencks adds. “A lot of the inequality may just be the legacy of those things.”
The prospect of upward mobility forms the very bedrock of the American dream, but analyses indicate that intergenerational mobility is no higher in the United States than in other developed democracies. In fact, a recent Brookings Institution report (a .pdf of the complete report can be read here) cites findings that intergenerational mobility is actually significantly higher in Norway, Finland, and Denmark—low-inequality countries where birth should be destiny if inequality, as some argue, fuels mobility.
In the United States, the correlation between parents’ income and children’s income is higher than chance: 42 percent of children born to parents in the bottom income quintile were still in the bottom quintile as adults, and 39 percent of children born to parents in the top quintile remained in the top quintile as adults, according to the Brookings analysis. But it is difficult to see whether mobility is increasing or decreasing, because it would require comparing specific individuals’ incomes to their parents’ incomes, against the wider backdrop of income distribution across society at that time. Because data with that level of detail do not exist for earlier periods, scholars can’t say with certainty whether the results represent an increase or a decrease in mobility from other periods in American history.
Americans’ steadfast belief in mobility probably stems from increases in absolute, rather than relative, mobility.
"The issue is trust and confidence among members of a unit. When some people with a different sexual orientation are in a close combat environment, it results in a lack of trust."
A group of American advisers led by a small State Department team played an integral part in drawing up contracts between the Iraqi government and five major Western oil companies to develop some of the largest fields in Iraq, American officials say.
The disclosure, coming on the eve of the contracts’ announcement, is the first confirmation of direct involvement by the Bush administration in deals to open Iraq’s oil to commercial development and is likely to stoke criticism. In their role as advisers to the Iraqi Oil Ministry, American government lawyers and private-sector consultants provided template contracts and detailed suggestions on drafting the contracts, advisers and a senior State Department official said. It is unclear how much influence their work had on the ministry’s decisions.
A very good summary of how hard-line neo-conservatives see the world — and especially Israel’s place in it — can be found in an interview at the National Review Online’s (NRO’s) website by Kathryn Jean Lopez of Caroline Glick, the deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post who also serves as the Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at Frank Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy (CSP).
What comes through the interview is how hard-liners like Glick see the relationship between the US and Israel (”the war against Israel and the war against the U.S. are one and the same”); the Manichean nature of the world (”freedom” versus “the forces of slavery and jihad,” “good” versus “evil”); how they conflate different threats (”al Qaeda and Iran” as a single “enemy” whose “ultimate aim …is global domination and the destruction of the US”); their contempt for Europe (its “refusal to accept the true lessons of the Holocaust”); their Islamophobia (”genocidal anti-Semitism …has taken over the Islamic world”); and their need for an “enemy” to give order to their world (Obama “refuses to acknowledge that there is such a thing as an ‘enemy’ in international affairs. And as a consequence, he is unable to understand what an ally is.”) Glick is also furious with Condoleezza Rice and the State Department for their presumed influence over Bush and efforts to force Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians.
