Dana Milbank, hardly my favorite political pundit, actually has an Op-Ed in today's
Washington Post that is worth reading (and short enough to fit into anyone's busy schedule). The piece is entitled "What the Family Would Let You See, the Pentagon Obstructs" and it directly challenges the Pentagon's policy of maintaining a veil of secrecy over military funerals - blocking the media from sharing these tragic events and what they represent to the American public at large.
Milbank notes that "The family of 38-year-old [Lt. Col Billy] Hall, who leaves behind two young daughters and two stepsons, gave their permission for the media to cover his Arlington burial -- a decision many grieving families make so that the nation will learn about their loved ones' sacrifice." However:
[T]he military had other ideas, and they arranged the Marine's burial yesterday so that no sound, and few images, would make it into the public domain. That's a shame, because Hall's story is a moving reminder that the war in Iraq, forgotten by much of the nation, remains real and present for some. Among those unlikely to forget the war: 6-year-old Gladys and 3-year-old Tatianna. The rest of the nation, if it remembers Hall at all, will remember him as the 4,011th American service member to die in Iraq, give or take, and the 419th to be buried at Arlington. Gladys and Tatianna will remember him as Dad.
The two girls were there in Section 60 yesterday beside grave 8,672 -- or at least it appeared that they were from a distance. Journalists were held 50 yards from the service, separated from the mourning party by six or seven rows of graves, and staring into the sun and penned in by a yellow rope. Photographers and reporters pleaded with Arlington officials. [Snip]
Media whining? Perhaps. But the de facto ban on media at Arlington funerals fits neatly with an effort by the administration to sanitize the war in Iraq. That, in turn, has contributed to a public boredom with the war. A Pew Research Center poll earlier this month found that 14 percent of Americans considered Iraq the news story of most interest -- less than half the 32 percent hooked on the presidential campaign and barely more than the 11 percent hooked on the raid of a polygamist compound in Texas.
Two more must-reads on Iraq:
First, Steven Simon from the Council on Foreign Relations has written a strong editorial analyzing the "Price of the Surge" in the May/June issue of
Foreign Affairs (h/t: Patrick Barry at
Democracy Arsenal. And Barry does an excellent job of breaking down and summarizing Simon's rather long article in his blog post at DA:
Steve Simon's new piece in Foreign Affairs [the CFR's house organ -Ed.] is a must-read for anyone concerned with the long-term consequences of the United States arming tribal factions in Iraq. His argument is similar to the ones made by Marc Lynch and Brian Katulis over the past few months - that the administration, by prizing security gains over political consolidation and compromise, has actually worsened Iraq's long term prospects for achieving an open, functional society.
Simon does a pretty good job cataloging the history of the surge - though it was originally intended to be matched by a top-down political strategy of consolidation and cooperation, US leadership grew so frustrated with the apparent lack of political movement that it quickly substituted in a new policy, which embraced a series of local developments and cobbled them together under the dubious label of "bottom-up reconciliation." I agree with Simon's argument, namely that this pursuit is dangerously short-sighted because it has stoked "the three forces that have traditionally threatened the stability of Middle Eastern states: tribalism, wardlordism, and sectarianism."
Of course, chief among the local developments latched onto by the administration, has been the phenomenon of Sunni tribes turning on Al-Qaeda in Iraq, a move largely precipitated by the AQI's use of poisonous methods to subjugate Sunni communities. But when it comes to tribalism, we're tinkering with an especially complex and dangerous dynamic, one that has been a force for instability in the Middle East broadly, and Iraq specifically since at least the 19th century.
Click on the link to the blog post for more.
Second, this widely circulated (in liberal circles, at least)
editorial from Frank Rich in the
New York Times does a laudatory job of analyzing the factors that have led to the mainstream media, and the American public, to tune out the ongoing catastrophic military occupation of Iraq. As Rich concludes his piece:
The simple explanation for why we shun the war is that it has gone so badly. But another answer was provided in the hearings by Senator George Voinovich of Ohio, one of the growing number of Republican lawmakers who no longer bothers to hide his exasperation. He put his finger on the collective sense of shame (not to be confused with collective guilt) that has attended America’s Iraq project. “The truth of the matter,” Mr. Voinovich said, is that “we haven’t sacrificed one darn bit in this war, not one. Never been asked to pay for a dime, except for the people that we lost.”
This is how the war planners wanted it, of course. No new taxes, no draft, no photos of coffins, no inconveniences that might compel voters to ask tough questions. This strategy would have worked if the war had been the promised cakewalk. But now it has backfired. A home front that has not been asked to invest directly in a war, that has subcontracted it to a relatively small group of volunteers, can hardly be expected to feel it has a stake in the outcome five stalemated years on.
The original stakes (saving the world from mushroom clouds and an alleged ally of Osama bin Laden) evaporated so far back they seem to belong to another war entirely. What are the stakes we are asked to believe in now? In the largely unwatched House hearings on Wednesday, Representative Robert Wexler, a Florida Democrat, tried to get at this by asking what some 4,000 “sons and daughters” of America had died for.
The best General Petraeus could muster was a bit of bloodless Beltway-speak — “national interests” — followed by another halfhearted attempt to overstate Iraq’s centrality to the war on Al Qaeda and a future war on Iran. He couldn’t even argue that we’re on a humanitarian mission on behalf of the Iraqi people. That would require him to acknowledge that roughly five million of those people, 60 percent of them children, are now refugees receiving scant help from either our government or Nuri al-Maliki’s. That’s nearly a fifth of the Iraqi population — the equivalent of 60 million Americans — and another source of our shame.
The prevailing verdict on the Petraeus-Crocker show is that it accomplished little beyond certifying President Bush’s intention to kick the can to January 2009 so that the helicopters will vacate the Green Zone on the next president’s watch. That’s true, but by week’s end, I became more convinced than ever that in January we’ll have a new policy that includes serious withdrawals and serious conversations with Mr. Maliki’s pals in Iran, even if John McCain becomes president.
General Petraeus and Mr. Crocker define victory as “sustainable security” in Iraq. But both Colin Powell and Gen. Richard Cody, the Army’s vice chief of staff, said last week that current troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan are unsustainable and are damaging America’s readiness to meet other security threats. And that’s not all that’s unsustainable. An ailing economy can’t keep floating the war’s $3-billion-a-week cost. A Republican president intent on staying the Bush course will find his vetoes unsustainable after the Democrats increase their majorities in Congress in November. No war can be fought indefinitely if the public has irrevocably turned against it.
Mr. McCain says Americans want “victory,” whatever that means today, and yes, they would if it could be won on the terms promised by Mr. Bush five years ago — fast, and with minimal sacrifice. It’s way too late to ask for years of stepped-up sacrifice now in the cause of a highly debatable definition of “national interests.”
This war has lasted so long that Americans, even the bad apples of Abu Ghraib interviewed by Mr. Morris, have had the time to pass through all five of the Kübler-Ross stages of grief over its implosion. Though dead-enders like Mr. McCain may have only gone from denial to anger to bargaining, most others have moved on to depression and acceptance. Unable to even look at the fiasco anymore, the nation is now just waiting for someone to administer the last rites.
Food for thought.
Update: Reading for the ambitious (with abundant time on his or her hands!) - this
study "Whose Views Made The News? Media Coverage And The March To War In Iraq."
Quick summary: Criticism of the news media’s performance in the months before the Iraq war has been profuse. Scholars, commentators, and journalists themselves have argued the media aided the Bush administration in its march to war by failing to air a wide-ranging debate that offered analysis and commentary from diverse perspectives. As a result, critics say, the public was denied the opportunity to weigh the claims of those arguing both for and against military action in Iraq. In this paper, we report the results of a systematic analysis of ABC and CBS nightly news coverage in the eight months before the invasion (Aug. 1, 2002 through March 19, 2003).
We find news coverage conformed in some ways to the conventional wisdom: Bush administration officials were the most frequently quoted sources, the voices of anti-war groups and opposition Democrats were barely audible, and the overall thrust of coverage favored a pro-war perspective. But while domestic dissent on the war was minimal, opposition from abroad—in particular, from Iraq and officials from countries such as France, who argued for a diplomatic solution to the standoff—was commonly reported on the networks. While we surmise the opinions of foreign leaders would probably have been accorded less credibility by many Americans than the views of U.S. officials, the public was not entirely deprived of an alternative viewpoint.
Our findings suggest that m
edia researchers should further examine the inclusion of non-U.S. views on high-profile foreign policy debates, and they also raise normative questions about how the news filters the communications of political actors and refracts—rather than merely reflects—the contours of debate.